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COMMENTS
The Costly Exercise of Religion: Issues on Diocesan
Bankruptcy Estate Formation and First Amendment
Implications
I. Introduction
The scope of religious freedom has historically been a contentious legal
matter in the United States. Contemporary litigation is no exception.
Recently the Supreme Court held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
that the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that employers grant its female
employees access to no-cost contraceptives violated the religious freedom
of closely held corporations. 1 Just this past year the Court held in E.E.O.C.
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. that a prospective employer must
accommodate a religious practice, such as the requirement to wear a
headscarf, whether or not the employer has actual knowledge of the
religious need. 2 Issues of contraception and workplace discrimination,
however, are almost commonplace in the ongoing national debate on
religious freedom. But another, often overlooked religious freedom issue
needs to be addressed: What happens when a Catholic diocese files for
bankruptcy in order to manage sex-abuse claims?
Due to the overwhelming amount of clergy abuse claims that have arisen
in the past several years, numerous dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church
have found it necessary to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The values of the
damages awarded to the abused claimants have been so extensive that many
dioceses have found the only way in which they may continue ministerial
operations and adequately satisfy the judgement obligations to the victims
is to utilize bankruptcy protection. At the outset of the abuse scandal, the
following dioceses all filed for bankruptcy in response to the litigation
damages owed to tort claimants: Portland, OR; Spokane, WA; and Tucson,
AZ. 3 Subsequently, many other dioceses followed this recourse in order to
1. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015).
3. See In re Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 4-04-bk-04721JMM, 2007 WL 3124445, at *1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Oct. 23, 2007); Tort Claimants Comm. v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 868, 876 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); Comm. Of Tort Litigants v.
Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 310 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part, 2006 WL 211792 (E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d in part, 364
B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
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pay their own judgment creditors and maintain church operations.4 The
scope of the diocesan bankruptcies has reached as high as $198 million 5
and the extent of the property involved has been vast. 6 Furthermore,
because Catholic dioceses only began seeking bankruptcy protection in
2004, 7 many of the issues presented provide entirely new categories of
bankruptcy litigation and issues on the Bankruptcy Code’s effect on
religious freedom.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides the means for a diocese to reorganize its
assets and distribute from a settlement repayment plan to the victims of the
abuse while still performing its ministerial functions.8 However, the
corporate structure of a Catholic diocese, the rules of Chapter 11
bankruptcy, and the U.S. Constitution create several impediments in
ensuring the tort claimants receive adequate damages while still protecting
the religious and corporate interests of the church. 9 These issues are
important because they display a clear legal conflict between the United
States’ historical emphasis on religious freedom and the rigid requirements
of modern bankruptcy law. One of the most contentious and litigated points
in the diocesan bankruptcies is to what extent the individual church
parishes’ property must be subject to the bankruptcy proceedings of their
4. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 482 B.R.
792 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012); In re Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Gallup, 513
B.R. 761 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2014); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Catholic
Diocese of Wilmington, Inc. (In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington), 432 B.R. 135 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2010); In re Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego, 374 B.R. 756 (Bankr. S.D. Cali.
2007); Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, Case No.
15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2015); Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Roman Catholic
Bishop of Helena, Mont., Case No 14-60074 (Bankr. D. Mont. Mar. 5, 2015); Voluntary
Petition at 1, In re the Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, Case No. 4-20371 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. Jan 16, 2014); Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, Case
No. 08-00110 (Bankr. D. Alaska May 17, 2010); Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Diocese of
Davenport, Case No. 06-02229 (Bankr. D. Iowa May 1, 2006).
5. Amy Julia Harris, Catholic Dioceses Declare Bankruptcy on the Eve of Sexual
Abuse Trials, REVEAL (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/Catholic-diocesesdeclare-bankruptcy-on-eve-of-sexual-abuse-trials/.
6. See Joseph A. Rohner IV, Catholic Diocese Sexual Abuse Suits, Bankruptcy, and
Property of the Bankruptcy Estate: Is the “Pot of Gold” Really Empty?, 84 OR. L. REV.
1181, 1182 (2005) (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 1181.
8. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.07(3) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2013).
9. See Felicia Anne Nadborny, “Leap of Faith” Into Bankruptcy: An Examination of
the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839, 850-51 (2005); Rohner, supra note 6, at 1194.
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governing diocese. 10 Under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, if the
individual parishes’ assets are owned by the parishes themselves then the
property is not subject to the diocese’s bankruptcy. 11 However, if the
property is considered to be owned by the diocese, it must be included in
the bankruptcy estate. 12 Because the most significant and valuable property
within the diocese is primarily the property of the individual parishes, the
valuation of the bankruptcy estate is considerably affected by whether that
property is included or excluded. 13
There is a distinct set of issues on the forced inclusion of parish property
in diocesan bankruptcy estates that has been frequently litigated. The first
of these issues is whether the corporate structure of each Catholic diocese
allows the bishop to exclude assets of the individual parishes from the
bankruptcy estate. 14 Several dioceses have argued that the structure of the
diocese itself requires that parish assets be excluded under the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code and its exceptions. 15 The Code of Canon Law, the
system of laws and principles that act as the internal order and direction of
the Catholic Church, clearly defines a distinction between the diocese as
one entity and each individual parish as their own. 16 However, this
Comment concludes that unless each individual parish is actually separately
incorporated within the applicable state, the corporate structure of a diocese
does not afford such protection to the parishes.
The second issue looks at whether there exists a sufficient trust
relationship between the diocese and the parishes that allows exclusion of
parish assets. 17 If the diocese and the bishop are acting as trustees in a trust
relationship with each parish then the diocese has no equitable interest in
the property of the parishes. 18 This is important because property merely
10. See, e.g., Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.
(In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 868, 875-76 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005); Comm. Of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 309-10 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part, 2006 WL 211792
(E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d in part, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) (stating that it is property of the debtor that goes into
the estate); see also Rohner, supra note 6, at 1184.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
13. See Rohner, supra note 6, at 1189-90.
14. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 855.
15. See, e.g., id.; Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 330.
16. 1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3.
17. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 867; Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 327-28.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2012).
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held in trust by a debtor is not to be included in the bankruptcy estate.19 The
bankruptcy courts have analyzed whether an express trust exists between
the dioceses and its parishes or whether a constructive or resulting trust
exists, both causing the same effect on the bankruptcy estate. 20 In viewing
the bankruptcy courts’ analyses of this argument, this Comment argues that
a trust-like relationship can protect some property but fails as a general
exclusionary rule for all parish assets.
Finally, there is the issue of whether the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) provide
constitutional protection by barring the creditors and bankruptcy courts
from requiring inclusion of parish assets in the bankruptcy estate. The
dioceses have argued that forcing the inclusion of parish property in the
estate substantially burdens their free exercise of religion.21 Two of the
current issues regarding parish assets in a diocesan bankruptcy, and the
primary purpose for which I have written this Comment, are (1) whether the
creditors in these proceedings constitute government actors, and therefore,
whether the RFRA may apply at all, 22 and (2) whether the Bankruptcy Code
itself constitutes a compelling governmental interest, and therefore, if the
RFRA does apply, whether it provides any protection from forced inclusion
of parish assets in the bankruptcy estate.23 Several circuit courts are split on
these issues and their resolutions are paramount for understanding the
constitutional implications of the diocesan bankruptcy proceedings. 24 This
Comment argues that because of the private nature of the creditors’
interests, 25 the creditors do not constitute government actors, and therefore
the RFRA does not apply. Furthermore, because of the private nature of
creditors’ interests, courts should reject the notion that the Bankruptcy
Code and its provisions can be deemed compelling governmental interests.

19. Id.; see also Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 325.
20. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 327-30.
21. See, e.g., Listecki ex rel. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Catholic Cemetery Perpetual
Care Trust v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee),
485 B.R. 385, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.) (Listecki I), rev’d, 496 B.R. 905 (E.D. Wis. 2013)
(Listecki II), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (Listecki III); Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 888.
22. See Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 737 (citing 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-2(1)).
23. See id. at 745-46.
24. See id. at 741; Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1419 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th
Cir. 1998).
25. See Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 741.
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The structure of this Comment is as follows: Part II discusses the basic
legal background regarding bankruptcy law and the formation of the
bankruptcy estate, particularly focusing on Chapter 11 reorganization. Part
III looks at the application of bankruptcy law to the particular nature of the
Catholic dioceses and discusses some of the major issues that have arisen
from this application by presenting several holdings of the bankruptcy and
circuit courts. Part IV discusses the current state of these issues and how the
courts are likely to proceed. Part IV also presents some considerations for
the dioceses to best obtain the protection they seek for their parishes.
Finally, Part V presents a conclusion on these issues and arguments.
II. Legal Background
Bankruptcy provides a rigid set of federal laws that a debtor suffering
from “financial failure” must follow to satisfy the applicable chapter of
bankruptcy and to provide adequate payment to any unsecured creditors. 26
This includes a valuation of the debtor’s assets and liabilities, identification
of applicable creditors, and formation of a bankruptcy estate. 27 The two
primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to provide a fresh start to the
debtor via statutory discharge 28 and to protect the interests of the creditors
in the most equitable way possible. 29 Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a
means for a debtor to reorganize the entity in a manner that allows payment
to creditors while maintaining operation of its business or function. Under
Chapter 11 reorganization, the interests of the debtor further switch from
chiefly focusing on the discharge of debts to preventing the business from
going into liquidation. 30 Although Chapter 11 bankruptcy is primarily
geared toward businesses, other entities not actively engaged in business
may file for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. 31
The Bankruptcy Code provides two specific forms of relief: liquidation
and rehabilitation. 32 Liquidation requires a sale of all the debtor’s
nonexempt assets, the proceeds of which are distributed to the creditors.33
26. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1).
27. See id.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012); see also Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S
365, 367 (2007); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1).
29. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1) (citing Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966)).
30. See id. (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984)).
31. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 177 (1991); see also 11 U.S.C. § 109.
32. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1).
33. See also 6 id. ¶ 700.01.
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Liquidation bankruptcy is controlled by Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 34 Rehabilitation, on the other hand, allows the debtor to hold the
property subject to an eventual workout of payments under an agreement
known as a “plan.” 35 Chapter 11, one of the several forms of rehabilitation
bankruptcy, “provides an opportunity for a debtor to reorganize its business
or financial affairs or to engage in an orderly liquidation of its property
either as a going concern or otherwise.” 36 The primary policy behind a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is that it enables a business debtor to maintain
operation as opposed to a complete liquidation.37 An important requirement
under rehabilitation is that the repayment plan must have a total value equal
to what the creditors would have received under liquidation.38 In the
attempt to operate as functionally as possible during and after the
bankruptcy proceedings, a Chapter 11 debtor often aims to exclude assets
from the bankruptcy estate.
Upon filing the bankruptcy petition and commencing bankruptcy
proceedings, two immediate legal consequences take effect. First, an
automatic stay of all pending and future litigation against the debtor and the
debtor’s property is enacted. 39 The automatic stay provides the debtor
protection from additional creditors attempting collection of their debts and
allows for an adequate assessment of the debtor’s assets and liabilities.40
Second, a bankruptcy estate is formed in which all the debtor’s pre-petition
property is included. 41 Commencement of the bankruptcy case alone is
sufficient to instantaneously create the bankruptcy estate.42 Under the terms
of the Bankruptcy Code, the estate is to include all of the debtor’s legal and
equitable interests.43 However, any property the debtor owns in legal title
alone, and not in equitable title, may be included in the estate and accessed
by creditors “only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title . . . but not to the
extent of any equitable interest.” 44 Furthermore, property held in trust by
the debtor and for the benefit of a non-debtor will be excluded from the
34. Id. ¶ 700.01.
35. See 7 id. ¶ 1100.01. That is not to say that the assets themselves are safe from the
bankruptcy proceedings in its entirety.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
40. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(2)(a).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
42. Id.; see also Towers v. Wu (In re Wu), 173 B.R. 411, 413 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)-(6).
44. Id. § 541(d).
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estate. 45 Therefore, a central determination for any entity litigating a
bankruptcy case is the extent to which assets must be included in the
bankruptcy estate and which assets may be excluded.
An important characteristic of Chapter 11 reorganization over other
forms of bankruptcy is that the debtor will actually remain in possession of
the business’s assets after filing the bankruptcy petition, which makes the
debtor known as a “debtor-in-possession.” 46 A creditor, however, can
require that an independent trustee be appointed if there exist facts
indicating the debtor is no longer suited to manage the business and its
reorganization. 47 This aspect of Chapter 11 highlights that there is some
flexibility for the debtor under Chapter 11 proceedings, giving the debtor
both great control over the continuing operation of the business and the
bankruptcy estate itself. 48 Furthermore, this characteristic creates an
increased possibility for litigation on what property must be included in the
bankruptcy estate.
III. Bankruptcy Code Applied to Dioceses and Issues Raised
From the outset of the clergy abuse litigation, twelve dioceses of the
Catholic Church and two Jesuit orders 49 have filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. 50 To date, the settlements have ranged from $9.8 million to
more than $198 million. 51 The number of claimants involved in each case
has ranged from about 50 to 362. 52 The earliest of the bankruptcy filings
came in 2004 from the Archdiocese of Portland, and the most recent filing
came in early 2015 from the Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis.53
The majority of the proceedings took more than a year to reach a confirmed
payment plan, and many of the cases have yet to reach that point. 54 These
basic numbers display that the scope of these proceedings is extensive and
45. Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990).
46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107-1108; see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
8, ¶ 1100.01.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
48. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1100.01.
49. Jesuit orders are individual organizations within the Society of Jesus, a Catholic
order of priests and brothers founded in the sixteenth century. See The Jesuits, JESUITS,
jesuits.org/aboutus (last visited May 13, 2017). Although organizations of a subsect of the
Catholic Church, Jesuit orders are structurally similar to dioceses. See id.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
51. Harris, supra note 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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that the bankruptcy estates at issue are dealing with large sums of valuable
property.
In understanding the issues that have arisen from the diocesan
bankruptcies, it is helpful to understand the basic organization of the
Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is a hierarchical church system. 55
The Holy See sits at the top of the hierarchy, led by the Pope and the
Vatican City. 56 Connecting the Holy See and the many dioceses of the
United States are the Papal Nuncio, the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, and the Cardinals, which assist the Pope in running the U.S.
Catholic Church on a national level.57 The 195 U.S. Catholic dioceses and
archdioceses 58 control the regional level of the church and each diocese
contains numerous individual parishes within its control.59 Each individual
church parish contains various parcels of real property, from the church
proper itself to schools, cemeteries, and administrative buildings. 60 The
structure of the ownership of this property, which raises the issues set forth
in this Comment, is that the bishop (or archbishop in the case of an
archdiocese) actually holds the property of each parish in legal title.61 All of
the internal structuring of the church and the orders and directives for every
level are set out in the Code of Canon Law. 62
The structure of a Catholic diocese creates several issues regarding the
formation of the bankruptcy estate. The corporate structure of the Church
itself raises an issue on the nature of the ownership of diocesan assets. The
dioceses’ “trust-like” relationships with the parishes raise further problems
regarding which property belongs in the estates. The individual parishes
and the constitutional protections provided to religious institutions all create

55. Allison Walsh Smith, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A New Battleground in
the Ongoing Conflict Between Catholic Dioceses and Sex-Abuse Claimants, 84 N.C. L. REV.
282, 319 (2005).
56. See Nadborny, supra note 9, at 845 (citing Yasmin Abdullah, The Holy See at
United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (1996)); Paul
Lewis, At the U.N. Activists Vie with Vatican over Abortion, THE N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999,
at 1-3.
57. See Nadborny, supra note 9, at 846 (citation omitted).
58. Bishops and Dioceses, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (June 2016),
http://www.usccb.org/about/bishops-and-dioceses/.
59. See Rohner, supra note 6, at 1183.
60. See id.
61. See id. The author notes that the bishop owns the property in legal title “as well as
cash or liquid financial assets that also ostensibly belong to each parish. In addition, each
diocese or archdiocese owns specific real and personal property for its own uses.” Id.
62. See generally 1983 CODE.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/4

2017]

COMMENTS

703

a difficult environment for forming a diocesan bankruptcy estate. These
varying issues have been addressed in many of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Additionally, the holdings on similar issues have been decided in various
ways. A common focus of these issues is the question of which assets must
be included in the diocesan bankruptcy estate and which assets may be
excluded.
A. Corporate Structure
Most jurisdictions allow a church diocese to incorporate as a corporation
sole. 63 The corporation sole “lacks traditional shareholders and traditional
internal corporate structures.” 64 A corporation sole is a legal entity
“consisting of one incorporated office filled by one person and administered
without a board of directors.” 65 In terms of the Catholic Church, the bishop
of the diocese (or the archbishop of the archdiocese) generally holds this
office. Technically, the single office of a corporation sole holds all assets in
legal title. However, the equitable title of most diocesan assets is actually
held by the individual entities (parishes, schools, cemeteries, etc.). Under
the Supreme Court’s holding in Begier v. I.R.S. 66 that assets for which the
debtor holds no equitable title are not property of the estate,67 many
dioceses have argued that no parish assets are to be included in the estate. 68
Under the provisions of Chapter 11, all of the debtor’s property is to be
included within the bankruptcy estate.69 One position held by the dioceses
regarding this requirement is that the property of the individual parishes,
schools, and other entities are not to be included in the estate because they
constitute separate legal entities.70 Under the provisions of Canon Law,
each parish constitutes its own “juridic person,” 71 or separate legal entity,

63. See Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 868, 876 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
64. Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping the Faith: The Rights of Parishioners in Church
Reorganizations, 82 WASH. L. REV. 75, 89 (2007).
65. Sole Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
66. 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2012).
68. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 860; Comm. Of Tort
Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304,
321 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part, 2006 WL 211792 (E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d
in part, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
70. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 853; Catholic Bishop
of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 312.
71. 1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3.
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under the canons of Catholic law. 72 As a corporation sole, the bishop (or
archbishop) encompasses the civil body of the diocese, but the parishes, as
individual juridic persons, encompass their own. 73 Under this view, the
diocese does not envelop every parish within its legal identity, but rather
“the Bishop merely has supervisory duties and oversight of all the juridic
entities in the Diocese.” 74 Furthermore, as juridic persons, parishes “are
‘subjects of obligations and rights’ under Canon Law,” and included in
“these recognized rights is property ownership.”75 As a separate legal entity
and a non-debtor in the diocese’s bankruptcy, a parish need not include its
property in the bankruptcy estate.76 However, many creditors object by
arguing that as a corporation sole, the diocese actually encompasses all its
parishes in a single corporate body. 77 The creditors argue that as a single
corporate unit, all the assets held by the bishop in any capacity must be
included in the estate.78 The courts have addressed the question of how the
corporate structure of a diocese affects the bankruptcy estate in several
ways.
In the bankruptcy proceedings for the Archdiocese of Portland, the
bankruptcy court held that the assets of individual parishes be included in
the bankruptcy estate of the archdiocese.79 Although Canon Law provides
that a parish is its own juridic person, the Archdiocese of Portland itself has
acknowledged that a juridic person is not necessarily an identity recognized
by civil law. 80 The separation between a diocese and the individual parishes
constitutes merely an internal structure, not distinct legal entities capable of
holding separate title to property. 81 Although later overturned, the
bankruptcy court for the Diocese of Spokane similarly held that all parish
assets must be included in the estate based upon the structure of the diocese
and the effect excluding the assets would have on the creditors. 82 The
72. Edward L. Buelt & Charles Goldberg, Canon Law & Civil Law Interface: Diocesan
Corporations, 36 CATH. LAW. 69, 71-73 (1995).
73. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 321.
74. Id.
75. Smith, supra note 55, at 319 (quoting 1983 CODE c.113, § 2).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
77. See, e.g., Tort Claim. Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In
re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 867 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005);
Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 330.
78. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 311.
79. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 868.
80. Id. at 866; see also 1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3, c.1256.
81. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 868.
82. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333.
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bankruptcy court noted that “[r]eligious organizations do not exist on some
ethereal plane far removed from society.” 83 The bankruptcy court in
Portland, along with the lower court holding in Spokane, held that
corporate law applied, rather than the internal structuring of the Church
under the Catholic Code, and therefore, the Catholic Code’s designation of
each parish as a separate juridic person does not provide a means for the
diocese to exclude parish properties from the bankruptcy estate. 84
In a contrary decision, the court in the bankruptcy proceedings for the
Diocese of Tucson acknowledged the individual parishes as independent
legal entities, and therefore, held that the assets of each parish were immune
from the diocesan estate. 85 The bankruptcy court confirmed the
reorganization plan of the diocese, which expressly stated that each
individual parish within its control was a separate juridic person, and
therefore, the assets of each parish belong solely to the parish. Similarly,
the reorganization plan for the Diocese of Northern Alaska excluded parish
property and separated the parishes as independent juridic persons.86 Both
of the reorganization plans stated that parish property was held by the
diocese in only legal title and that all equitable interests were held by the
individual parishes. 87 Although the litigants never disputed the matter of
excluding parish assets, the courts’ confirmations of the reorganization
plans expressly stated that the structure of the dioceses allowed exclusion,
implying the courts recognized the notion.
In litigation over the estate for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, the court
also aligned with the court in Tucson and held that the individual parishes
constitute independent legal entities. 88 The diocese is a non-stock
corporation and the parishes constitute their own independent civil
corporations by the nature of their property ownership and daily activities. 89
The court expanded on the Tucson holding by denying the creditors’
83. Id. at 324.
84. Id. at 325; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 854.
85. Third Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of
Reorganization at 18-19, In re The Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, 2015
WL 1978432 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (No. 4-bk-04-0471-JMM).
86. Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization for Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska at 34, In re
Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 2008 WL 8652366 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2008) (No. 08-00110DMD).
87. Id.; Third Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of
Reorganization, supra note 85, at 18-19.
88. In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. 693, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012)
(Archdiocese of Milwaukee I).
89. Id.
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attempts to utilize either an alter ego theory or a substantive consolidation
claim to access the assets of the parishes. 90 In order to pierce the corporate
veil, one of the necessary elements is the superior entity’s complete
domination of the lower entity. 91 The court held that there was not
sufficient evidence to show such domination in respect to a diocese over the
parishes because the parishes conducted business with a large degree of
autonomy. 92 Furthermore, the court held that there was not sufficient
entanglement for substantive consolation to offset potential harm to the
creditors, a necessary element for application of the theory. 93
Although the dioceses discussed have similar corporate structures, the
bankruptcy courts have ruled quite differently on how this affects the
identity of the individual parishes and whether parish assets are to be
included in the diocesan bankruptcy estate. 94 The question of whether the
parish assets are to be included in the diocesan estate based upon the
corporate structure of the diocese depends greatly on the jurisdiction in
which it is litigated, but most importantly, there is little direction in
understanding how the courts will address this issue.
B. Trust-Like Relationship Between the Diocese and Parishes
Another argument utilized by the dioceses is based upon the “trust-like”
relationship between the diocese and the parishes. As previously discussed,
if a debtor owns only the legal title and not an equitable interest in property
then a creditor may only receive the legal title from the bankruptcy estate.95
The possessor of the equitable interest, if a non-debtor in the bankruptcy,
will retain ownership through the proceedings. 96 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court held that property in which the debtor does not own an
equitable interest, but rather holds in trust for the benefit of another, will
not be included in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.97 Bankruptcy courts have
also held that, even in the absence of an express trust, the property held by a
90. Id. at 699-700.
91. Id. at 698 (citing Consumer’s Co-op. v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Wis.
1988)).
92. Id. at 699.
93. Id. at 699-700 (citing In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2nd Cir.
1988)).
94. See, e.g., id. at 699; Comm. Of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part,
2006 WL 211792 (E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d in part, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2012).
96. Id.
97. Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990).
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debtor in a constructive or resulting trust as trustee will not be included in
the estate. 98
Several dioceses have argued that the nature of the relationship between
the diocese and the individual parishes is a “trust-like” relationship.99 The
dioceses claim that the relationship puts the parishes as the beneficiaries of
a trust for which the bishop is the trustee, thus precluding inclusion of
parish assets under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 100 If a court
recognizes that the diocese owns only the legal title and the bishop is acting
as a trustee while the parishes possess the equitable interest as beneficiaries
then the parish assets must be excluded from the diocesan bankruptcy
estate. 101 The holdings on this issue have not been unanimous. 102 Thus, the
issue arises whether a trust-like relationship between the diocese and its
parishes can function as a means to exclude parish property from the
diocesan estate.
Generally, a trust arises by statute, either expressly or by judicial
imposition of a constructive or resulting trust. 103 Although later reversed,
the bankruptcy court in the Spokane proceedings held that the bishop acts as
a trustee for the diocese as a whole under an express trust. 104 The diocese’s
articles of incorporation expressly states that the bishop acts as a trustee of
all property of the diocese. However, there is no such express provision
regarding the diocese’s relationship over the property of the parishes and
other entities. 105 Although no form of express statute or written agreement
between the diocese and parishes exists, an implied trust may be formed via
judicial imposition as a constructive or resulting trust. 106 The court noted
that as a corporation sole, the bishop may hold the property in trust under a
98. Foothill Capital Corp. v. Clare's Food Mkt., Inc. (In re Coupon Clearing Service,
Inc.), 113 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997).
99. See, e.g., Archdiocese of Milwaukee I, 483 B.R. at 696; Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington (In re Catholic Diocese of
Wilmington, Inc.), 432 B.R. 135, 140-43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010); Tort Claimants Comm. v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 867 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329
B.R. at 325-29.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 848.
101. See Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 325 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502
U.S. 410, 432 (1992)).
102. See, e.g., id. at 333; Archdiocese of Milwaukee I, 483 B.R. at 700.
103. See Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 325; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
104. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 328.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 328-29.
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constructive or resulting trust.107 In its determination of whether such a trust
existed for the Spokane diocese, the court held that either a constructive or
resulting trust “requires that the underlying facts and circumstances
regarding the relationship and course of dealing between the parties must
demonstrate that it would be inequitable to allow the titleholder to retain the
beneficial interest in the property.” 108
In analyzing the facts underlying the property at issue, the court noted
that all the deeds to the disputed property reflect a fee simple absolute in the
diocese, and therefore, creditors “would have no reason to believe nor any
notice that the property was not an asset of the debtor.” 109 There is no
notice of any constructive or resulting trust or intent to create one therein
because the evidence does not demonstrate that it would be inequitable to
allow the titleholder to retain the beneficial interest. 110 Due to the lack of
any sufficient evidence to support the claim that a constructive or resulting
trust existed between the diocese and the parishes, the court held that no
such trust existed. 111 The court explained that, “[a]s to resulting trusts under
state law, no such trust exists until created by judicial act” and then
recognized that no such event had occurred.112 Therefore, the property of
each parish could not be excluded from the estate based upon the “trustlike” relationship because no express, constructive, or resulting trust existed
between the diocese and its individual parishes.113
In a more constraining holding, the court for the bankruptcy proceedings
for the Diocese of Portland held that, because each parish is a unit of the
diocese, the diocese could not legally hold property in trust for a parish. 114
The bankruptcy court noted that a corporation that “has the capacity to take
and hold legal title to property also has the capacity to be a beneficiary of a
trust of such property.” 115 Furthermore, the court recognized that an
unincorporated association may be the beneficiary of a trust.116 However,
the court held that there is no such authority that provides a means to “allow
a division of a corporation or a unit or part of a legal entity to be a
107. Id. at 325.
108. Id. at 329.
109. Id. at 333.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 331, 333.
112. Id. at 332.
113. Id. at 332-33; see also 11 U.S.C § 544(a)(3) (2012).
114. Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 866-67 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
115. Id. at 867 (quoting 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 240 (2005)).
116. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 119 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
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beneficiary of a trust.” 117 The diocese is organized as a corporation sole and
did not separately incorporate the individual parishes, and therefore, the
diocese did not provide the parishes with the legal protections and powers
of an independent corporation.118 The parishes are merely units of the
diocese, and due to this, the diocese cannot hold assets of the parishes in
trust for the parishes. 119 Ultimately, the court in the Diocese of Portland
proceedings held that the diocese could not exclude parish assets based on
the trust argument. 120
The bankruptcy proceedings for the Diocese of Wilmington raised a
similar question of whether a trust relationship existed between the diocese
and the parishes. 121 Specifically, the court analyzed whether a pooled
investment program operated by the diocese and participated in by the
individual parishes was property of the diocese or a beneficial interest of
the parishes from a trust. 122 Each parish transferred funds to the diocese,
which then deposited the funds into the pooled investment program, and the
diocese then invested those funds on behalf of the parishes. 123 The
bankruptcy court noted that a resulting trust arises when a disposition of
property is made with the inference that the person holding the property
does not acquire the beneficial interest.124 The court held that this
investment program constituted a resulting trust because it was the intent of
the parishes to have the diocese invest the transferred funds on their behalf
and not to convey their beneficial interest.125 However, the court concluded
that the assets within this fund were commingled and indistinguishable with
the diocese’s own funds in the program to the extent that it was too difficult
to trace individual funds back to the respective parishes.126 Although the
court acknowledged that an enforceable trust relationship existed in regard
to the investment program, the entire worth of the program was included in
the estate because it was far too difficult to trace funds back to the
individual parishes. 127 Therefore, under this analysis it is clear that a parish
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc. (In
re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc.), 432 B.R. 135, 139 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 142-44.
124. Id. at 149 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 404 (AM. LAW. INST. 1935)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 161.
127. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006)).
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fund can be protected from inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. However, it
will be included in the estate if the parish funds become commingled with
the diocese’s funds and cannot be traced. 128
Citing the decision in In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., the
court in the bankruptcy proceedings for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee held
that the assets in the Parish Deposit Fund were not included in the
archdiocese’s bankruptcy estate.129 Similar to the investment fund in
Wilmington, the deposit fund included funds transferred by the parishes to
be invested by the diocese on behalf of the parishes. 130 The court held that
the archdiocese used the funds on behalf of the parishes and this constituted
a resulting trust relationship.131 Distinguishing this holding from the
Wilmington proceedings, the court noted that the funds were deposited into
one segregated bank account and clearly traceable back to the parishes.132
The funds did not become commingled with those of the archdiocese or
other parishes, and therefore, were clearly identifiable as property of the
parishes. 133 The court concluded that the archdiocese was acting as a trustee
for the transferred funds on behalf of the parishes, the diocese did not hold
any equitable or beneficial interest in those funds, and therefore, the funds
were not included in the diocesan estate.134
In the bankruptcy proceedings for the Diocese of Helena, the court
confirmed the Second Amended Plan of Reorganization, which appears to
have excluded parish assets from the diocese’s bankruptcy estate.135 The
First Amended Plan of Reorganization expressly stated that property
belonging to the individual parishes and programs within the diocese—
totaling over $41 million in assets—was held in trust and would not be
included in the bankruptcy estate. 136 The diocese claimed that the assets
128. Id.
129. In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. 855, 869 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012)
(Archdiocese of Milwaukee II) (citing Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., 432 B.R. 135).
130. Id. at 868.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 869.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Proposed by The Roman
Catholic Bishop of Helena, Montana and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In
re Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena, Mont., No. 14-60074 (Bankr. D. Mont. Mar. 5, 2015).
136. Disclosure Statement for First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
Proposed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena, Montana and The Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors at 29, In re Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena Mont., No. 14-60074
(Bankr. D. Mont. Jan. 13, 2015).
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included were held in legal title by the diocese but held in trust for the
benefit of the individual parishes, schools, and other entities. 137
Furthermore, the committee of creditors reserved the right to dispute this
claim, but the “[p]lan represent[ed] a settlement of any dispute that could be
raised regarding ownership.” 138 The Second Amended Plan of
Reorganization does not include this express provision regarding the parish
property. 139 However, the confirmed Second Amended Plan does not
contradict the provision in the First Amended Plan of Reorganization and it
does not include the parish assets in the ultimate bankruptcy estate. 140
Therefore, while the reasoning behind excluding the parish assets may not
have necessarily been accepted by the court, the court did allow the
exclusion of parish assets from the diocesan bankruptcy estate by
confirming the plan.
The different holdings by these bankruptcy courts on whether or not the
trust-like relationship between a diocese and its parishes may protect the
parishes from forced inclusion of property into the bankruptcy estate further
highlight the confusing nature of a diocesan bankruptcy. The relationship
between a diocese and individual parishes is unlike most corporate
structures. The extent of autonomy of the parishes in their day-to-day
practices supports the theory that the relationship is closer to a trust-like
relationship rather than a single legal body. 141 The fact that the diocese
generally holds legal title for all of the disputed property in fee simple
absolute, however, conflicts with this theory. 142 Therefore, the current state
of the diocesan bankruptcies lacks a unified resolution to the issue of
whether the trust-like relationship between the diocese and its parishes
allows exclusion of parish assets from the bankruptcy estate.
C. Constitutional Protection of Religious Institutions
Bankruptcy proceedings of religious entities create several constitutional
issues. The estate requirements in the Bankruptcy Code appear to cause an
entanglement between the government and the church that could be deemed
137. Id.
138. Id. at 25.
139. See Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Proposed by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena, Montana and the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors, supra note 135.
140. Id. at 14-15.
141. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee I, 483 B.R. 693, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012).
142. See Comm. Of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop
of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 331 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part, 2006 WL 211792
(E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d in part, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
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unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 143
Furthermore, the effects and burdens that arise from the application of the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code on a Catholic diocese appear to violate
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment under the constitutional
standards set by Congress in the RFRA. 144 Specifically, several dioceses
argued that including the parish assets in the estate violated the free
exercise protection under the RFRA. 145 There are currently two major
circuit splits regarding the issue of the diocesan estate formation and First
Amendment implications.146
1. The Establishment Clause
Including the property of individual parishes and entities in the diocesan
bankruptcy estate creates a possible constitutional issue between the estate
requirements per section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” 147
Diocesan debtors have unsuccessfully claimed that, by including all the
assets of the parishes in the estate under section 541, the court violated this
separation between government and religious entities.148
Under constitutional analysis, a statute violates the Establishment Clause
if (1) the statute has a secular purpose, (2) the principal or primary effect of
the statute advances or inhibits religion, and (3) the statute creates an
excessive entanglement between government and religion. 149 It has further
been recognized that the third prong of this test constitutes the primary
focus for Establishment Clause analysis.150 An argument utilized by
143. See, e.g., Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.
(In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 859 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). This statute was held unconstitutional as applied to
states, but as to bankruptcy proceedings, a matter of federal law, the RFRA is still
applicable. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
145. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 859.
146. See Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2015); Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96,
104 (2d Cir. 2006); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th
Cir. 1998).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335
B.R. at 859, 862.
149. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
150. Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 8 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Nadborny, supra note 9,
at 871.
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dioceses is that, by including parish assets in the bankruptcy estate, the
Bankruptcy Code fails this third prong. 151 In essence, the dioceses argue
that the Bankruptcy Code, judicial proceedings, and forcing specific assets
into the estate constitutes excessive entanglement.152 The creditors,
however, argue that such entanglement fails to reach the level of excessive
because it was the church’s voluntary acts that created the entanglement.
The Archdiocese of Portland raised the defense that the adjudication of
whether parish property is to be included in the diocesan estate entangled
the Bankruptcy Code with religious matters in violation of the
Establishment Clause.153 The court noted that, in resolving disputes
regarding church property, it has been held that a court may apply “neutral
'secular principles of property,’” such as state or federal statues, without
violating the First Amendment.154 This allows the court to rely on objective
and well-established concepts of law, providing a flexible approach that can
apply to all forms of religion. 155 The applicable, neutral secular law in any
bankruptcy proceeding is the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore, applying the
provisions and court interpretations thereof does not violate the First
Amendment due to excessive entanglement. 156 Furthermore, the court held
that applying the principles of the Catholic Code for formation of the
bankruptcy estate would negate the neutral requirement.157 The Supreme
Court has expressly held that the application of neutral law that affects a
religious property will not violate the Establishment Clause as long as it is
generally a secular principle.158 Although the diocese may be operated
under internal church law, the Canon Law does not govern church property
ownership in the secular world. 159 Therefore, the court held that the sole
reliance on the Bankruptcy Code in resolving the parish property dispute
did not constitute an excessive entanglement between the government and
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.160

151. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 853; see also Grutka, 549 F.2d
at 8; Nadborny, supra note 9, at 871-72.
152. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 853.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 854 (citing Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179
F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1999)).
155. Id. (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979)).
156. Id.; see also Nadborny, supra note 9, at 871-72.
157. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 854.
158. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1249.
159. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 859.
160. Id. at 853.
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2. Free Exercise Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
An additional constitutional issue arises from the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and the RFRA. 161 The Free Exercise Clause provides
that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of
religion. 162 Modern analysis of the Free Exercise Clause began as a
balancing test of whether the challenged law constituted a substantial
burden on one’s practice of religion. 163 If a court determined the law
imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, the statute in
dispute would be required to further a compelling governmental interest to
avoid invalidation.164 In Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, however, the Supreme Court rejected this
balancing test, fearing that the test “would open the prospect of
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind.” 165 Therefore, the Court held that “neutral,
generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when
not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”166 The shift in Smith
allotted much weaker protection for religious entities: any law that did not
directly target religion would not be required to satisfy the compelling
interest standard of strict scrutiny. 167
In response to the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993. 168 The RFRA was intended to
provide broad protection for religious freedom169 in acknowledging that
“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”170 The RFRA provides
that, if a federal law creates a substantial burden on the exercise of religion,
the statute must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard to be held in compliance
with the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. 171 Therefore, any statute
161. See Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905 (E.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780 F.3d
731 (7th Cir. 2015).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
163. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
164. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406.
165. 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
166. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997).
167. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
169. Id. § 2000bb(b); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2760 (2014).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
171. Id. § 2000bb-1.
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that creates a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion must further
a compelling governmental interest and do so by the least restrictive means
possible. 172 This is a standard that will rarely be met and will likely lead to
the overturning of the statute by the courts.
There are two major circuit splits regarding the application of the RFRA
to the diocesan bankruptcies. The first split pertains to the scope of the
RFRA and whether the creditors to the diocese constitute a government
actor necessary to trigger the RFRA’s protection.173 The Seventh Circuit
held that the creditors were acting purely from self-interest, and therefore
were only private actors. 174 The Eighth Circuit, however, expressly held
that that the RFRA was an appropriate defense in bankruptcy
proceedings. 175 The second split is on the issue of whether the Bankruptcy
Code constitutes a compelling governmental interest, which is a necessary
element for satisfying the strict scrutiny standard once a statute is found to
have substantially burdened religious practice.176 The Seventh Circuit again
rejected the RFRA claim by holding that the Bankruptcy Code does
constitute a compelling governmental interest; 177 conversely, the Eighth
Circuit held it does not. 178 These two circuit splits represent the most
pressing issues regarding the diocesan bankruptcies in their current state,
and their resolutions are essential to understanding religious freedom in
regard to bankruptcy proceedings.
a) Determination of a Government Actor Under the RFRA
In order for a diocese to obtain constitutional protection under the RFRA
from including parish property in the bankruptcy estate, inclusion must
constitute a substantial burden on the church. Generally, a substantial
burden on religious exercise “is one that necessarily bears direct, primary,
and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise—including
172. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
173. Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2015); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical
Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
174. Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 736-37.
175. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1417; see also Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that a federal statute substantially burdening free exercise may be asserted as
a defense in “any action”); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying the RFRA to a private plaintiff in a gender discrimination claim against a religious
employer).
176. Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 746; Christians, 82 F.3d at 1419.
177. Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 746.
178. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
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the use of real property for the purpose thereof within the regulated
jurisdiction—effectively impracticable.”179 Requiring each individual
parish to include its property in the estate of the diocese may constitute a
substantial burden on the parish’s free exercise because application of the
Bankruptcy Code could leave the parishioners and children with no place to
worship or study. 180 Therefore, another central issue with the diocesan
bankruptcy estate is whether the inclusion of parish assets violates the Free
Exercise Clause under the standards of the RFRA.
The Archdiocese of Portland argued that, under the RFRA, the parish
assets must be excluded from the bankruptcy estate because inclusion
would substantially burden the free exercise of their religious practices. 181
This argument was founded on Canon Law, which states that the parishes—
not the diocese—own parish property. 182 The archdiocese further argued
that inclusion of the parish assets in the estate would greatly constrain the
parishioners’ ability to practice and study religious materials.183 The court
noted that if the inclusion of parish assets constituted a substantial burden,
the burden would most certainly fail to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard as
“the interests advanced by the bankruptcy system are not compelling under
the RFRA.” 184 However, the court ultimately held that the determinations
under section 541 estate formation are merely on the status of property
ownership and is, therefore, incapable of imposing actual burden on the
exercise of religion.185 The court concluded that the inclusion of parish
assets is not a substantial burden, and the protection provided under the
RFRA is inapplicable to the diocese’s bankruptcy proceedings.
A similar argument arose in the bankruptcy proceedings for the
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, in which the archdiocese claimed that being
forced to include the Cemetery Perpetual Case Trust, a $55 million fund
used to maintain all Catholic cemeteries within the archdiocese, would
179. Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905, 920 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban
Believers v. City of Chi., 343 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780
F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
180. See Radwan, supra note 64, at 110.
181. See Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 859 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
182. Id.; 1983 CODE c.1256.
183. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 864; see also Radwan, supra
note 64, at 110.
184. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 864 (quoting Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated,
521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998)).
185. Id. at 861; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
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substantially burden the church.186 The diocese argued that the loss of the
fund would eliminate the church’s ability to bury its members in
accordance with religious doctrine. 187 Furthermore, general upkeep of the
archdiocese’s cemeteries would be greatly hindered without access to this
fund. 188 The focus of the court’s analysis centered on whether the trust
could even apply under the RFRA, as the act only applies to actions of the
government. 189 Although the creditors, and not the state, moved to have the
cemetery fund included in the bankruptcy estate, they were doing so under
color of law of the Bankruptcy Code and performing a public function.190
The bankruptcy court held that by acting under color of law, the actions of
the creditors were “fairly attributable to the government.” 191 Furthermore,
the bankruptcy court held that because the diocese would lose the ability to
maintain its cemeteries and bury its members, requiring the cemetery fund
be included in the estate constitutes a substantial burden. 192 The creditors
further claimed that even if requiring the fund be included in the estate
constitutes a substantial burden, the interest of preserving the bankruptcy
system is a sufficiently compelling interest and would thus satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. 193 The bankruptcy court, however, held that preservation
of bankruptcy failed to reach the importance of a compelling interest and
that forcing inclusion of the cemetery fund into the diocesan estate violated
the diocese’s free exercise under the RFRA. 194
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed this
holding. The central issue addressed by the circuit court was whether the
creditors did in fact constitute the “government” in order for the RFRA to
apply. 195 The distinguishing point arises in the argument that the committee
of creditors constitutes the “government” because it performs a public
function under color of law of the Bankruptcy Code. 196 Although there are
some overlapping functions, a “governmental entity is to act as an impartial
supervisor of the bankruptcy process . . . . [t]he Committee [of creditors],
186. Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905, 909-10 (E.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780
F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
187. Id. at 911.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 915.
190. Id. at 919.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 920-21.
193. See id. at 922.
194. Id.
195. Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2015).
196. Id. at 737-40.
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however, is far from impartial.” 197 The committee members became
creditors through their own private transactions with the debtor and each is
a private, individual creditor. 198 The circuit court notes that to act under
color of law and to act as a government actor are interchangeable terms, 199
but acting out of self-interest contradicts the notion of acting under color of
law for a public function. 200 The decision that the RFRA precludes the
inclusion of the cemetery fund into the diocesan bankruptcy estate was
thereby reversed. 201
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Listecki starkly conflicts with the
holdings by several other circuit courts. 202 The Seventh Circuit held that the
RFRA does not apply because the creditors are not government actors, 203
and yet other circuit courts have held that the RFRA would apply even if
the offending party was not a government actor. 204 The Eighth Circuit held
that the RFRA is an actionable defense in bankruptcy proceedings against
the bankruptcy trustee. 205 The Second Circuit held that the RFRA applies to
“any action” of a “federal statute [that] substantially burdens the exercise of
their religion.” 206 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that the RFRA applied to a
private plaintiff’s discrimination claim against a religious employer. 207
These cases held that the RFRA applied in a situation firmly rejected by the
Seventh Circuit, creating a clear circuit split on whether the RFRA applies
in the diocesan bankruptcy proceedings. An appeal on this issue was
petitioned for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court by the Archdiocese in

197. Id.
198. Id. at 738.
199. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982)).
200. Id. at 740-41.
201. Id. at 749-50.
202. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
83 F.3d 455, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by
141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
203. Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 737-38.
204. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 109; Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 455; Christians, 82
F.3d at 1417.
205. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
206. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 104.
207. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 455.
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the proceedings for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 208 but the parties later
settled, 209 leaving the issue unanswered and the circuit split in place.
b) Strict Scrutiny Standard and the Bankruptcy Code
Circuit courts are additionally split over the issue of whether the interests
of the Bankruptcy Code constitute a compelling governmental interest. As
noted above, if a court determines that a statutory requirement imposes a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, then the interest
furthered by that statute must be of a compelling governmental interest and
applied in the least restrictive means to satisfy the requirements under the
RFRA. 210 If a court finds that applying a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
constitutes a substantial burden on a church or religious entity, it then must
be determined whether the Bankruptcy Code itself furthers a compelling
governmental interest.211 Otherwise, the burden fails the strict scrutiny
standard of the RFRA and violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 212
In the bankruptcy proceedings for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, the
Seventh Circuit additionally analyzed “whether there is a compelling
governmental interest in the [c]hallenged [p]rovisions” of the Bankruptcy
Code. 213 The circuit court acknowledged that there is no bright-line
definition of a compelling governmental interest, but, similar to other courts
that have decided on the interests of the Bankruptcy Code, noted that it
must be an interest “of the highest order.” 214 In offering examples of such
interests, the court referenced several Supreme Court cases that held
interests such as the tax system, 215 social security, 216 and public
safety/national security217 satisfied the heightened requirements of strict

208. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Listecki ex rel. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Catholic
Cemetery Perpetual Care Trust v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors, 136 S. Ct. 581
(2015) (Mem.) (No. 15-28), 2015 WL 4100301.
209. See Brendan O’Brien, Federal Judge Approves Milwaukee Archdiocese Bankruptcy
Plan, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wisconsin-archdioceseidUSKCN0SY27L20151109.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
211. See id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1).
212. See id.
213. Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 745 (7th Cir. 2015).
214. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 546 (1993)).
215. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989).
216. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982).
217. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
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scrutiny. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Listecki III argued that
the protection of the creditors and their interest was the compelling
governmental interest under the Bankruptcy Code. 218
The Seventh Circuit, agreeing with the creditors, held that the
Bankruptcy Code constitutes a compelling governmental interest because
the nature of the interests that are furthered aligned with those of the social
security system. 219 Analyzing the Bankruptcy Code similar to the Supreme
Court in United States v. Lee, the court here noted that the “broad scope and
remedial nature of the [c]ode are akin to those interests the Court has held
are compelling this test, e.g., the social security system.” 220 Similar to the
Bankruptcy Code, the “social security system ‘serves the public interest by
providing a comprehensive . . . system with a variety of benefits available
to all participants’ nationwide.”221 The social security system supports all of
those who have either reached sixty-five years of age or have some form of
disability. 222 The Bankruptcy Code, like the social security system, aids all
of those burdened by a certain financial condition by safely allowing them
to repay their debts and still contribute to society as an individual or
business entity. 223 Analogizing the interests of the Bankruptcy Code with
those of the social security system, the circuit court held that the specific
provisions challenged by the Committee of Unsecured Creditors and the
Bankruptcy Code as a whole furthered a compelling governmental
interest. 224 Therefore, the circuit court held that even if requiring the
Archdiocese to include the Cemetery Fund in the diocesan bankruptcy
estate did constitute a substantial burden under the RFRA, the requirements
of the Bankruptcy Code would satisfy the strict scrutiny standard as
furthering a compelling governmental interest.225 Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit held that generally, “the protection of creditors . . . . is a compelling
governmental interest that can overcome a burden on the free exercise of
religion.” 226
Conflicting with the Seventh Circuit’s decision, several courts have held
that the application of the Bankruptcy Code does not constitute a

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 745.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 746.
Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982)).
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)).
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 745-46.
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compelling government interest. 227 The Eighth Circuit in Christians
analyzed the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Code itself constituted a
compelling governmental interest and ultimately held that it failed to reach
this standard. 228 The court noted that the “RFRA does not define
‘compelling governmental interest’” but that “[c]ompelling governmental
interest[s] have been described . . . as ‘interests of the highest order.’”229 In
applying this standard, the court viewed other interests that had been
previously held to be compelling governmental interests: 230 interests such
as public safety and national security. 231 The primary interests of the
Bankruptcy Code are to provide the debtor with a fresh start while
simultaneously protecting the interests of all the creditors.232 The Eighth
Circuit held that these interests, while important, “fell ‘short of direct
national security and public safety concerns.’” 233 The circuit court found
that the interests of the Bankruptcy Code were too localized to reach such a
level of import. 234 Therefore, the circuit court held that the Bankruptcy
Code and its provisions failed to satisfy the standard of a compelling
governmental interest under the RFRA. 235
Concurring with the Eighth Circuit in Christians, the bankruptcy court in
the proceedings for the Archdiocese of Portland held that the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code also fail to reach the importance of a compelling
governmental interest.236 The court noted that the purpose of the provisions
in question is meant to “maximize the bankruptcy estate and thereby
227. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407,
1420 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.
1998); Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905, 921-22 (E.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780
F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015); Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland
in Or. (In re Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005);
Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884, 898
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1996); In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
228. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
229. Id. at 1419 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
230. Id. at 1420.
231. Id. (citing Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405).
232. Id.; see also Julian Ellis & David M. Hyams, RFRA: Circuits Split on "Compelling
Government Interest”, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2015, at 36, 37; 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1).
233. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420 (quoting Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
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maximize the recovery for creditors,” and yet many exceptions to this
purpose exist within the Code itself. 237 Furthermore, the court noted that
there are exceptions to providing the debtor with a fresh start upon
completion of the bankruptcy proceedings, which, as noted above, is one of
the two central interests advanced by the Code. 238 The court highlighted
these exceptions to raise the point that “the Bankruptcy Code itself provides
for exceptions that do not further the policies of the Code.” 239 The claim
that an interest furthered by a statute is of the highest order appears
problematic if exceptions to that very same interest are provided within its
own provisions. 240
The Seventh Circuit directly held in a diocesan bankruptcy case that the
Bankruptcy Code in general constitutes a compelling governmental
interest. 241 The Eighth Circuit, along with four other courts, 242 conversely
held that the Bankruptcy Code fails to reach the level of import as a
compelling governmental interest.243 These conflicting decisions have
established a circuit split on whether the Bankruptcy Code constitutes a
compelling governmental interest.244 As dioceses continue to file
bankruptcy over mounting litigation awards to clergy abuse claimants, a
unified doctrine is required on this question.
IV. Analysis of the Diocesan Bankruptcy Issues
Issues or elements of the issues discussed are still unresolved based on
the past court decisions. Although there are different state bankruptcy
courts deciding these issues, the Bankruptcy Code is a federal code.
Interpretation of property is largely a state issue, but determinations of
237. Id.
238. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (statutorily provided exceptions to debtor
discharge).
239. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 864.
240. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993);
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
241. Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 746 (7th Cir. 2015).
242. Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905, 921-22 (E.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780
F.3d 731; Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland,) 335 B.R. 842, 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005);
Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884, 898
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1996); In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 466 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
243. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1417
(8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
244. See Ellis & Hyams, supra note 232, at 36.
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whether specific property belongs in the bankruptcy estate is a matter of
federal law. 245 However, because church litigation on this scale is ever
increasing, the issues on how the dioceses must form their estates are
increasingly important, and therefore, a degree of unification will be
required. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the issues to find the
strongest resolutions in order for both the courts and the Church to
understand how to proceed in future bankruptcy cases.
A. The Corporate Structure of the Diocese
As the debtor-in-possession, the bishop must keep the interests of the
creditors in mind during the bankruptcy proceedings because the debtor-inpossession owes a fiduciary duty to the creditors. 246 Although the tenets of
the Catholic hierarchy and Canon Law dictate the bishop protect the
interests of the parishes and ability of parishioners to practice, the
Bankruptcy Code legally requires the bishop to subordinate those interests
to those of its creditors. 247 This creates a significant issue for the diocese
because the best interest of the creditors would require the inclusion of
parish assets in the estate to ensure maximum relief. However, if courts
acknowledge the parishes as separate legal entities per the Canon Code, 248
the bishop could avoid the fiduciary duty to include parish property in the
bankruptcy estate in order to maximize repayment plan to creditors. There
is a significant conflict of interest here, and therefore, the corporate
structure of the church has important effects on the formation of the estate.
Although some courts have excluded parish assets based on the corporate
structure of a Catholic diocese, courts should not uphold this practice. 249
The dioceses’ central argument is that the Catholic Code’s definition of
each parish as a separate juridic person allows the state to identify each
parish as a separate civil entity. 250 Although the diocese alone is generally
the actual civil entity incorporated with the respective secretary of state, 251
the corporate structure from within the organization, under Canon Law,
clearly separates the diocese and it’s individual parishes as distinct juridic
persons. 252 The weakness of this argument is fairly clear on its face: state
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Board of Trade of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924).
Radwan, supra note 64, at 117.
Id. at 118-20.
1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee I, 483 B.R. 693, 699-700 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012).
See 1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3.
See Radwan, supra note 64, at 89.
1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3.
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law governs what is a distinct civil entity and not corporate articles of
incorporation, bylaws, or other internal governing documents. 253 A diocese
structured as a corporation sole is just that, a corporation with a sole,
overseeing office that is the legally recognized entity and all other
individual entities within are under its legal control. 254
To avoid the preemption of state law over the intended structure of
Canon Law, a diocese would likely need to individually incorporate each
parish as a separate legal entity. 255 The bankruptcy court in the proceedings
for the Diocese of Tucson accepted this as a viable strategy to protect the
assets of each parish from the diocesan bankruptcy estate.256 The Diocese of
Tucson’s reorganization plan allowed for each individual parish to hold
legal title of its property, and therefore, allowed exclusion of the property
from the diocese’s bankruptcy estate.257 A previous author writing on this
issue noted that incorporating every individual parish “would not harm
parishioners” and “would begin to resolve the property disputes.” 258
Therefore, although the clear application of the law bars the use of the
Catholic Code as a means to avoid including parish assets in the bankruptcy
estate, a diocese could anticipate these issues by individually incorporating
each parish.
The important point to take from the diocesan bankruptcy proceedings is
that the defense that the corporate structure of the diocese alone does not
protect parish assets from the estate. 259 States recognize the diocese as a
253. Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 866 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005)
(applying Oregon corporation law to the issue as opposed to the diocese's internal rules); see
Radwan, supra note 64, at 88.
254. See Sole Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
255. See Radwan, supra note 64, at 119-20.
256. Order Confirming the Third Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization, In re
The Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 4-bk-04-0471-JMM (Bankr. D. Ariz.
May 25, 2005); see also Debtor's Third Amended and Restated Plan or Reorganization at 77,
In re The Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 4-bk-04-0471-JMM (Bankr. D.
Ariz. May 25, 2005).
257. Order Confirming the Third Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization, supra
note 256; see also Debtor's Third Amended and Restated Plan or Reorganization, supra note
256, at 77.
258. Radwan, supra note 64, at 120.
259. See Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 868 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005);
Comm. Of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part, 2006 WL 211792
(E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d in part, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
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corporate sole, and under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, all assets
held by that office are subject to the bankruptcy proceedings. 260 The
internal Catholic Code may separate each parish as a distinct juridic
person, 261 but this should carry few legal consequences from the
perspective of the states and the bankruptcy courts.262 The states’ corporate
laws will preempt the internal Canon Law, whether in a bankruptcy
interpretation or under constitutional scrutiny.
B. “Trust-Like” Relationship Between the Diocese and Parishes
The trust-like relationship between a diocese and its individual entities
can provide some protection for parishes and other entities, but cannot be
extended to generally exclude all parish assets from the diocesan estate.
Although the relationship between the diocese and each parish in its
entirety may not protect the parishes from including assets in the
bankruptcy, certain funds and investment programs can be protected.263 In
Wilmington, the court held that an investment program constituted a
resulting trust because it was the intent of the parishes to have the diocese
invest the transferred funds on their behalf and not to convey their
beneficial interest.264 If the structure of the fund ensures that each
individual parish’s investment remains traceable back to the parish and does
not become commingled with the funds of the diocese or the entire fund,
then the resulting trust provides protection from including those funds in
the diocese’s bankruptcy estate.265
Other authors have argued that including the parish assets held in a
traceable resulting trust in the bankruptcy estate not only violates
bankruptcy law, but would infringe on the free exercise rights of the
dioceses and parishes. 266 The Bankruptcy Code itself expressly states that
recognized trust property is to be excluded from the bankruptcy estate, 267
260. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (2012).
261. 1983 CODE c.116, § 1, c.515, § 3.
262. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 868; Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333.
263. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee II, 483 B.R. 855, 869 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012);
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington (In re Catholic
Diocese of Wilmington, Inc.), 432 B.R. 135, 139 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
264. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., 432 B.R. at 148-49.
265. Archdiocese of Milwaukee II, 483 B.R. at 869; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(d).
266. See Daniel J. Marcinak, Separation of Church and Estate: On Excluding Parish
Assets from the Bankruptcy Estate of a Diocese Organized as a Corporation Sole, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 583, 633 (2006).
267. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d).
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and there is now precedential case law acknowledging that such trusts can
exist within the diocese-parish relationship. 268 Applying this doctrine to all
parish property, however, fails under the current understanding of how
bankruptcy law applies to the diocese-parish relationship. 269
One unanswered issue regarding exclusion of a traceable statutory or
resulting trust for which the diocese acts as trustee is the extent of what
property can be included in such a trust. The cases thus far have only
applied to specific trusts created for a very specific purpose, viz. investment
funds for the parishes. 270 It’s possible that instead of holding the legal title
of all parish property under the laws of a corporation sole, the diocese could
create individual trusts for each parish and its property. Although
exceptionally tedious, such an express trust relationship could very well
avoid the issues these dioceses have struggled with when reorganizing
under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. What is clear is that all parish property will
not be excluded merely based on the trust-like relationship. 271
C. Constitutional Protection
The bankruptcy proceedings of religious entities have also exposed
several constitutional issues. The estate requirements in the Code appear to
cause an entanglement between the government and the Church that could
be deemed unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 272 Furthermore, the effects and burdens that arise from the
application of the Bankruptcy Code on a Catholic diocese appear to violate
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment under the constitutional
standards set forth in the RFRA. 273 Specifically, several dioceses argued
that including the parish assets in the estate violated the free exercise
protection under the RFRA. 274 However, the circuit courts that have
addressed this issue conflict on whether the RFRA may even apply in a
diocesan bankruptcy. 275 If the RFRA does apply, the circuit courts will
268. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee II, 483 B.R. at 869; Catholic Diocese of Wilmington,
Inc., 432 B.R. at 140-42.
269. Comm. Of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part, 2006 WL 211792
(E.D. Wash. 2006) and rev’d in part, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
270. E.g., Archdiocese of Milwaukee II, 483 B.R. at 869.
271. See Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333.
272. See Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 850 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
274. E.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 859.
275. E.g., Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 741 (7th Cir. 2015).
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continue to disagree on whether application of the Bankruptcy Code could
pass muster under the standards of the RFRA. 276 Both of these issues carry
massive implications on the effects bankruptcy may have on religious
freedom.
1. Are the Creditors Acting Under Color of Law?
The Church cannot utilize constitutional protection under the RFRA
because the creditors, whether acting under a committee or not, are not
acting under color of law for a public function. A committee of creditors’
purpose is to ensure adequate compensation from private transactions.
Although a diocese has argued (successfully in a bankruptcy court) that the
committee of creditors is acting under the Bankruptcy Code, they are doing
so to ensure payment of a private transaction. 277 The dioceses argue that the
creditors are acting under color of law of the Bankruptcy Code and
performing a public function.278 This public function, as one diocese
articulated it, is to pursue claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and
ensure they receive equitable relief from the debtor. 279 However, it is
difficult to perceive this as a truly public function, as the central aim of the
committee is to ensure private litigants receive adequate compensation from
the damages suffered from clergy abuse. Although there are larger public
implications that may arise from the clergy abuse litigation—and the
sizeable damages that have been awarded thus from—these are not the
goals of the creditors. Their central, overarching goal is to fulfill a
transaction of money, albeit one dictated by the courts. Therefore, the
fundamental requirement of the RFRA—that the party asserting the burden
be a state actor 280—is not satisfied.
In ascertaining whether actions were done under color of law, courts
often look at the source of authority of the party asserting the statute and
determine whether it exists purely by a grant from the state.281 Generally,
the Supreme Court has held that a private party acts under color of law
when “there is a sufficiently close nexus” between the conduct of the
private party and the government so that the private party’s actions “may be

276.
277.
731.
278.
279.
280.
281.

E.g., id.
Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905, 919 (E.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 780 F.3d
Id.
Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
See, e.g., Temple v. Albert, 719 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

728

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:695

fairly treated as that of the [government] itself.” 282 Clearly stated, the Court
noted that the issue is “whether particular conduct is ‘private’ on the one
hand, or ‘state action’ on the other.” 283 As discussed, the committee of
creditors is seeking payment from a transaction between private parties.
The only substantial nexus between the creditors and the government is the
Bankruptcy Code itself. 284 The mere act of asserting compliance with a
federal law is far from a nexus substantial enough to constitute state action.
Therefore, their conduct in general is of a private nature.
An objection to this argument arises from the Second Circuit’s holding
in Hynkins v. Light, in which the court noted that the language of the RFRA
is broad enough to include actions of private citizens applying federal
law. 285 The circuit court first acknowledged the lack of case law on the
question of whether the “RFRA applies to an action by a private party
seeking relief under a federal statute against another private party who
claims that the federal statute substantially burdens his or her exercise of
religion.” 286 The court then noted that the statutory language itself appears
to include such an action by stating “that it ‘applies to all federal law, and
the implementation of that law.’” 287 Under this interpretation of the RFRA,
it appears that the color of law argument posed by the Seventh Circuit is
unnecessary. The creditors in a diocesan bankruptcy are seeking relief
under the terms of the federal Bankruptcy Code, which the Church claims is
substantially burdening their free exercise of religion. Because the
application of a federal law is causing the substantial burden, under the
Second Circuit’s view, the RFRA must apply. 288
Although the Second Circuit’s argument is persuasive, the lack of
precedential authority on applying the RFRA to disputes between two
private parties weakens this claim. In her dissenting opinion, then Second
Circuit Judge and current Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor argues
that the RFRA “does not apply to disputes between private parties.” 289 She
points out that even the “majority concedes that it is unable to find a single
282. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
283. Id. at 349-350 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723
(1961)).
284. See Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 738-40 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding no nexus between the
creditors and the government on the grounds of the committee's makeup, or its public
function).
285. 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
286. Id.
287. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 109 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
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holding that contradicts . . . that the RFRA does not apply to suits between
private parties.” 290 Furthermore, Sotomayor notes that because the
application of the RFRA to a dispute between private parties is not at
dispute in the case before the Second Circuit, the majority’s conclusion on
the issue is merely dicta.291 Although the breadth of the language in the
RFRA could be interpreted to allow application to private disputes, the
complete lack of any additional precedential interpretation of the statute in
this fashion highlights the weakness of this argument. Furthermore, the
precedent holding otherwise is overwhelming. 292
The RFRA requires state action in order for its strict scrutiny standard to
apply to a federal law.293 The text of the statute itself states that the
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion.” 294 Because the creditors, whether acting under a committee or
not, are not acting under color of law for a public function, the Church
cannot utilize constitutional protection under the RFRA to avoid the
disputed provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. Does the Bankruptcy Code Constitute a Compelling Governmental
Interest?
For similar reasons, the Bankruptcy Code could not be held to constitute
a compelling governmental interest. Although currently there is no
uniformity in the issue of whether the creditors of a Catholic diocese
constitute a government actor under color of law or whether the RFRA can
apply to actions between private parties, the circuit split strict regarding the
Bankruptcy Code as a compelling governmental interest also deserves
analysis. The Seventh Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code and its
provisions constitute a compelling governmental interest, 295 while the
Eighth Circuit directly held otherwise.296 If the Supreme Court decided that
the creditors under these circumstances do constitute a government actor,
the issue of whether the application of the Code and its provisions could
satisfy the scrutiny standard of the RFRA must be resolved. Not only is this
290. Id. at 114.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d
402, 410 (6th Cir. 2010); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834
(9th Cir. 1999).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
294. Id. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added).
295. Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 745-46 (7th Cir. 2015).
296. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1417
(8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated by 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
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question unanswered by the Court, but it is an issue conversely decided on
by many courts. 297
The Supreme Court previously noted that the RFRA “requires the
Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied
through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened.” 298 In analyzing the issues on diocesan bankruptcies, the Seventh
Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does in fact further a compelling
governmental interest.299 The circuit court found that the Bankruptcy Code,
analogous to the social security system, has a “broad scope and remedial
nature . . . akin to some of those interests the Court has held are
compelling.” 300 The Eighth Circuit contrarily held that “the interests
advanced by the bankruptcy system are not compelling under the
RFRA.” 301 It appears that the central disagreement between the two circuit
courts is on the issue of whether the interests furthered by the Bankruptcy
Code are furthering a public interest or merely a private one.302 Therefore,
the resolution of this split depends on whether the interests furthered by the
Bankruptcy Code in a diocesan bankruptcy are a public or private interest.
Historically, the two primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are to
provide a fresh start to the debtor via statutory discharge 303 and to protect
the interests of the creditors. 304 Under Chapter 11 reorganization, the
interests furthered by the Code to the debtor switch from chiefly focusing
on the discharge of debts to preventing the business or organization from
going into liquidation.305 The interests of the debtor are just that—only in
place to further the private interests of that individual or entity. The
297. See, e.g., Christians, 82 F.3d 1407; Listecki II, 496 B.R. 905 (E.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 780 F.3d 731; see also Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 744; Tort Claimants
Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley
Evangelical Free Church (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996); In re Tessier,
190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
298. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31
(2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)).
299. Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 745-46.
300. Id. at 746.
301. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
302. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 208, at 27.
303. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S 365, 367 (2007); 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012).
304. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 8, ¶ 1.01(1) (citing Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966)).
305. See id. (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984)).
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interests of the creditors, however, do not present as clear an understanding
of whether these interests are of a public or private nature. Therefore,
whether or not the Bankruptcy Code furthers any public interest depends on
whether the interests of the creditors as acknowledged under the
Bankruptcy Code are public interests. In the both circuit courts discussed,
the holdings specifically referenced the interests of the creditors as the point
of contention on the matter. 306 The Seventh Circuit held in Listecki that the
Bankruptcy Code in general, its particular provision, and primarily the
interest in protecting creditors constitute compelling governmental
interests. 307 The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, found that “protecting
the interests of creditors is not comparable” to others deemed to reach the
level of compelling. 308
Although the Bankruptcy Code imposes public order by protecting
creditors and ensuring fair treatment, the specific protection of these
creditors remains a private interest. The Supreme Court held that the
interests furthered by the social security system are of a compelling
interests “[b]ecause the social security system is nationwide.”309
Furthermore, the Court noted that the “system is by far the largest domestic
governmental program in the United States today.” 310 Like the decision in
United States v. Lee, interests considered compelling have generally been
on a massive scale. 311 The limited scope of the interests of the creditors
pales in comparison to the social security system. Specifically within the
diocesan bankruptcies, the creditors in question amount to several hundred
in the most extreme cases. 312 Because of the limited scope of the actual
interests furthered in favor of the creditors, the Seventh Circuit’s analogy to
the social security system appears inherently flawed. Social Security
reaches millions of Americans on a monthly basis. 313 Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit’s holding regarding the interests furthered by the Bankruptcy Code
follows the Supreme Court’s definition of a compelling governmental
interest much more closely. Because of this, the resolution of this circuit
split will likely lead to the rejection of the Seventh Circuit’s holding and a

306. Listecki III, 780 F.3d 731, 745-46 (7th Cir. 2015); Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
307. Listecki III, 780 F.3d at 745-46.
308. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
309. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).
310. Id. (noting that the social security system “distribut[es] approximately $11 billion
monthly to 36 million Americans”).
311. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 208, at 27.
312. See Harris, supra note 5.
313. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258.
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holding that protecting the interests of the creditors is not a compelling
governmental interest.
It is important to note that the argument is not the dioceses attempting
exemption from the Bankruptcy Code in its entirety, but rather to avoid the
specific application of section 541 and requiring that individual parish
property be included in the estate. As pointed out by other authors, the
dioceses are purposely seeking the protection of the Bankruptcy Code. 314
The issue is that “certain Code provisions as applied to particular property
or transactions” are substantially burdening their religious freedom. 315
Rejecting the Bankruptcy Code as a compelling governmental interest will
not undermine the application of the Code in a general sense, but will only
limit its application in a very particular case. In arguing that the Bankruptcy
Code falls short of being a compelling interest, it is important to note that
bankruptcy law is a significant body of law. Its significance, however, fails
to reach the level that allows a federal law to substantially burden the free
exercise of religion.
V. Conclusion
The corporate structure of the Catholic Church itself raises an issue on
the nature of the ownership of diocesan assets, but absent individual
incorporation of each parish, the structure affords little protection over
parish property. The “trust-like” relationship between the diocese and
parishes further raises problems regarding the property of the dioceses and
whether the diocese simply acts as a trustee of several trusts for which the
parishes are beneficiaries. Although the question is left open as to what
types of trusts can protect parish and individual entities’ assets from the
bankruptcy estate, it is now clear that only trusts which leave parish
property clearly traceable back to each respective parish are afforded the
protection under section 541(d). Once the funds or property become
commingled with those of the other parishes or the diocese at large, the
protection is lost. Furthermore, the individual parishes and the
constitutional protection provided to religious institutions creates a difficult
environment for forming a diocesan bankruptcy estate. Although the
Bankruptcy Code is a vastly influential federal code, its provisions likely
fall short of the strict scrutiny standard of a compelling governmental
interest. The RFRA, which was created to apply to neutral, generally
applicable laws such as the Bankruptcy Code, does not appear to apply to
314. See also Ellis & Hyams, supra note 232, at 66.
315. See id.
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private disputes. The creditors in the Catholic diocesan litigation are
seeking private recovery, and therefore do not constitute state actors. In its
current state, the RFRA will only apply to laws being enforced upon
religious entities by state actors or parties acting under color of law.
Because the creditors in these cases have not satisfied this requirement, the
dioceses cannot exclude parish assets through the RFRA.
Simon W. Bright
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